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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

20 April 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

25X1



II. ASIA-AFRICA

25X1

OK Japan: [Deliberations in the Diet on the new US-Japanese security treaty are reaching the decisive stage. Prime Minister Kishi, who is assured of sufficient votes for ratification, is planning to push for a vote by the lower house between 22 and 26 April. However, the opposition Socialists are insisting on further time for debate, and this demand has recently won some influential press support. Informed observers believe that unless the government delays its plans for ten days to two weeks, it will risk a Socialist boycott of the Diet and possibly widespread public furor over what would be considered its dictatorial attitude.]

25X1

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OK *South Korea: [The South Korean army chief of staff reported late on 19 April that the situation was under control in Seoul and other population centers which were placed under martial law following large-scale clashes in the capital. Despite the imposition of martial law, demonstrations were reportedly held in Seoul and several other South Korean cities during the morning of 20 April. Since the populace bears less animosity toward the military forces than it does toward the police, efforts of the troops to maintain order are less likely to provoke further violence. The situation will remain tense, however, and further disorders are possible. In any case, the resentment which led to the spontaneous disorders of the past month will remain as deep-seated ill feeling throughout the nation until drastic reforms are effected.]

25X1

OK Ceylon: Prime Minister Senanayake's month-old minority government appears to have only a slim chance of surviving the first test vote in Parliament on its policies. The vote is scheduled for 22 April. Although opposition abstentions or defections

25X1

might yet enable Senanayake to squeak through Friday's vote, this would only postpone his government's fall. Governor General Goonetilleke now seems inclined to order new elections if Senanayake is defeated, rather than to call on the divided opposition to try to form a government. [REDACTED]

25X1
Turkey: The three-month ban on all political activity announced in Ankara on 18 April followed several weeks of rising friction between the government and its political opposition, and at the least the move seems certain to increase tensions further. Administration spokesmen have accused the major opposition force, the Republican People's party, of "subversive, illegitimate, and illegal" activities, and have threatened that the Menderes government will "liquidate" that party. Meanwhile, recent attempts by the government to use the army for political purposes have caused dissatisfaction in military quarters, where Republican leader Inonu retains great popularity. [REDACTED]

South Africa: UN Secretary General Hammarskjold believes that the South African Government's reply to his approach about visiting South Africa presents an opening for further negotiations and thus postpones the need for further UN action on that country, at least for the time being. The Union government has suggested that Hammarskjold meet Foreign Minister Louw in London at the close of the Commonwealth prime ministers' meeting on 11 May to discuss arrangements for a visit in July or August. [REDACTED]

25X1
Within the Union, the failure of Black Africans to respond to calls for a work stoppage this week indicates that the virtual exhaustion of the urban Blacks' meager economic reserves, coupled with the widespread arrests of native leaders, has temporarily reduced Black African ability to organize antigovernment campaigns. [REDACTED]

III. THE WEST

OK Cuba: Fidel Castro has been angered by recent decisions of the Cuban Supreme Court favoring owners of expropriated properties, and he may be planning to name President Osvaldo Dorticos to head the court in an effort to control it more closely. [REDACTED]

20 Apr 60

DAILY BRIEF

ii

[redacted] Foreign Minister Raul Roa, under fire from extremists in the regime and discouraged by Latin American criticism of Cuban policies, may resign or be "retired" to the presidency. [redacted]

25X1

20 Apr 60

DAILY BRIEF

iii

25X1

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

US Security Treaty Issue Approaches Decisive Stage in Japan

[Deliberations in the Japanese Diet on the new US-Japanese security treaty are nearing the decisive stage. Prime Minister Kishi is planning to push for a vote between 22 and 26 April. Most of the conservative party dissidents who sought to extract from Kishi a commitment to resign as the price of their support for the treaty have been brought into line, and the government has more than sufficient votes to assure passage.]

[The opposition Socialists, despite a near-record 80-hour discussion of the treaty in committee, are insisting on further time for debate. Although unable to arouse popular interest in their nationwide campaign against the treaty, the Socialists recently have won some influential newspaper support for their insistence on additional time for debate.]

[] observers believe that unless the government delays for ten days or two weeks in bringing the treaty to a vote, it risks public charges of "arbitrary and arrogant" railroading of legislation. A delay, however, would necessitate extending the present Diet session beyond its expiration on 26 May to allow the upper house 30 days for action, as provided by the constitution. The Socialists, who have vowed to fight the Diet extension as well, are expected to boycott the treaty vote regardless of timing.]

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Seoul Declares Martial Law

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[Tension remains high in South Korea following what one American observer has described as a full-scale revolt.]

[South Korean Army Chief of Staff Song Yo-chan has stated that the situation is under control in Seoul and other major population centers which were placed under "emergency" martial law the afternoon of 19 April after having earlier in the day been put under less stringent "ordinary" martial law. An estimated 70,000 persons led by students stormed the presidential palace during the day to protest the rigging of the 15 March presidential elections. Preparations reportedly had been made to evacuate President Rhee by helicopter if necessary, but the rioters were repulsed by gunfire. During the morning of 20 April, however, demonstrations were held in Seoul and several other South Korean cities despite the imposition of martial law.]

25X1

[Since the populace bears less animosity toward the military forces than it does toward the police, efforts of the troops to maintain order are less likely to provoke violence. Further disorders, however, remain possible. According to the minister of defense, an ammunition warehouse has been looted by students and they now possess considerable amounts of firearms. The government has ordered universities and high schools closed throughout the country.]

[While the government appears to have enough force to impose its will on the people, the resentment which led to the spontaneous disorders of the past month will remain until drastic reforms are effected. The regime, however, has given no indication of willingness to grant political concessions to redress the situation.]

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Ceylonese Government May Be Defeated on First Parliamentary Test Vote

Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake's conservative minority government seems to have little chance of surviving the test vote in Parliament scheduled for 22 April. The ruling United National party (UNP) commands no more than 59 sure votes out of the total of 155 to be cast, and the outcome will depend entirely on uncommitted opposition elements. Some of these might abstain or even support the government, but it is unlikely that the UNP will receive the 19 additional votes necessary for an absolute majority.

In the event of the government's fall, Governor General Goonetilleke would be empowered either to dissolve Parliament and establish a caretaker government pending new elections or to request the second-ranking Sri Lanka Freedom party (SLFP) to form a government. Goonetilleke at present seems inclined to take the more reasonable step of dissolving Parliament and calling for new elections, presumably realizing that the SLFP could neither survive as a minority government nor patch together a lasting coalition from among the divided opposition ranks.

A government victory during Friday's vote would merely postpone its fall. Senanayake presumably realizes this and might choose to resign voluntarily rather than court damaging political attack and public disfavor by ruling without a clear mandate.

Turkish Government Bans Political Activities

The three-month ban on all political activity in Turkey, announced on 18 April, follows increasingly bitter exchanges between the two major political parties. The ban was announced by a commission set up earlier that day by the Grand National Assembly to investigate the "destructive, illegitimate, and illegal activities" of the opposition Republican People's party (RPP).

During the debate prior to establishment of the commission--composed exclusively of members of the governing Democratic party (DP)--fighting broke out between deputies on the floor of the assembly. [On 19 April street fighting broke out in Ankara when police dispersed a crowd near RPP headquarters.]

25X1

A cabinet member has publicly stated that the government will "liquidate" the RPP, which holds 173 of the 610 assembly seats. New repressive action against the opposition press in Turkey also appears imminent. These latest events seem certain to heighten tension and may result in increased underground activities by opponents of the present regime.

The latest crisis developed rapidly following events near the Turkish city of Kayseri in early April. The government had sought by warnings and the use of troops to prevent or delay the tour of the Kayseri region by Ismet Inonu, head of the RPP. These heavy-handed methods backfired, however, and Inonu appears to have emerged from the trip with enhanced support throughout the country.

At this point the Democratic party apparently decided to attack the RPP directly through the legislature. A statement issued by the DP on 12 April warned that the RPP was implementing "a very violent policy of provocation and organizing plans capable of leading to incidents or uprisings." On

25X1

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17 April, the RPP replied by introducing a motion accusing Premier Menderes and his party of "attempting to crush the constitutional rights of citizens" and calling for a parliamentary investigation.

While bitter partisanship is not new on the Turkish political scene, the present situation contains new and potentially dangerous implications for both Turkish democracy and the security of the state. At least four army officers resigned--and were subsequently arrested--following the Kayseri affair. In addition, reports of irritation in high military circles at the government's treatment of Inonu--a former military leader--have created new doubts regarding the army's support for the present regime. In Istanbul, a recent crudely handled attempt by the police to "plant" a weapon on the person of a prominent opposition newsman has caused new consternation over the administration's use of the police for political purposes.

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III. THE WEST

Castro May Be Planning High-Level Government Changes

Fidel Castro and the officials who run his revolutionary reform program are dissatisfied by the Cuban Supreme Court's recent decisions favoring owners of expropriated properties and by its agreement to investigate charges of mistreatment of political prisoners. Castro is always angered by such obstructions to his plans or authority. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There is increasing evidence that extremist officials like Vice Foreign Minister Francisco Chavarry are critical of Roa's handling of the proposed Havana conference of underdeveloped nations and of his choice of personnel for posts abroad, and that they are trying to have him removed.

Criticism of Castro's policies by Venezuelan President Betancourt and other Latin American leaders whom Roa respects apparently has discouraged Roa, and he may prefer to return to his teaching career or accept some figurehead post such as the presidency. Hart, his rumored successor, is believed to be dominated by his wife, Haydee Santamaria, and other pro-Communists influential in Cuban foreign affairs.

Continued guerrilla opposition activity in Oriente Province heightens the possibility that Castro will make some move to strengthen his control. He said on 18 April that he would make important announcements in a speech at the May Day celebrations. [REDACTED]

25X1

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